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Recovery for Damage to the Defective
Product Itself: An Analysis of Recent Product
Liability Legislation*
I. INTRODUCrION
Defective products may cause various types of harm, including personal injury
and property damage. Generally, recovery for harm to property falls within one of the
following three categories: 1) damages for injury to property other than the product
itself, 2) damages for injury to the product itself, and 3) damages for injury to
business expectations, including lost profits and loss of use of the product.'
Traditionally, plaintiffs seeking recovery for such property loss proceeded under
theories of negligence, strict liability in tort, misrepresentation, breach of express or
implied warranty, and breach of contract.2
Due to the reputed insurance crisis and the current wave of tort reform, state and
federal legislatures are now considering legislation to protect manufacturers and
suppliers from seemingly excessive tort liability. These legislative proposals super-
sede state common law dealing with tort product liability cases. The proposed Ohio3
and federal4 legislation excludes from product liability actions claims in which the
plaintiff seeks recovery for the defective product itself, leaving these claims to be
governed by applicable commercial or contract law. 5 This remedy is inadequate and
inconsistent with the decisions of a majority of courts that include physical harm to
the product itself within the scope of tort products liability. 6
This Note analyzes the theories of recovery allowed for property damage to the
defective product itself under both state and federal legislation, as well as under
common law. This author contends that the pending Ohio and federal acts fail to
provide an adequate remedy for property loss by limiting the applicable recovery
theory to commercial law. By excluding tort remedies, the bills are inconsistent with
present law in the majority of jurisdictions, including Ohio, which provide tort
recovery for physical harm to the product itself. This Note proposes that the Ohio and
* Editor's Note: Since the completion of this Note, the Ohio legislation referred to (H.B. 996) has been amended
(Am. Sub. H.B. 1) to conform with the positions advocated by the author. Nonetheless, the Note still serves as a useful
comment on the issues surrounding this controversy which may arise in other jurisdictions. With regard to the federal bill
(S. 666), the positions taken by the author and the arguments supporting them are still pertinent.
At the time of publication of this Note, the current Ohio products liability legislation (Am. Sub. H.B. 1) had been
passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate and signed by Governor Richard F. Celeste.
1. Note, Economic Losses and Strict Products Liability: A Record of Judicial Confusion Betveen Contract and
Tort, 54 NoTRE DAkiE L. REv. 118 (1978) [hereinafter Note].
2. Bland & Wattson, Property Damage Caused by Defective Products: What Losses Are Recoverable?, 9 WM.
Mrrcuu. L. REV. 1 (1984) [hereinafter Bland & Wattson].
3. H.B. No. 996, 116th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1985-86).
4. S. 666, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987).
5. S. 666, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 103(a) (1987); H.B. No. 996, 116th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. § 2307.71(B)
(1985-86).
6. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1981) (applying
Pennsylvania law); Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248 (Alaska 1977); Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J.
52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965). See generally Bland & Wattson, supra note 2, at 3-4.
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federal legislatures amend the bills to include physical injury to the defective product
itself within the scope of the product liability acts.
I. HISTORY OF RELEVANT PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW
A. Negligence
Although various theories were available, negligence was the primary method of
recovery before the recent emergence of strict liability and is still very viable today.
7
A cause of action founded upon negligence in a products liability case follows the
traditional formula. For example, a plaintiff must prove that a person (the product's
manufacturer or its seller) breached his legally recognizable duty to conform to a
certain standard of conduct (manufacture and sell safe products).s In addition, this
breach must be the proximate cause of the actual losses suffered.9
The majority of products liability law t0 has developed in the twentieth century
because, prior to that time, a requirement of contractual privity prevented consumers
from suing remote manufacturers. I The English case of Wright v. Winterbottom'
2
originated the privity requirement by establishing that the original seller of goods was
not liable for damages caused by their defects (to anyone except his immediate buyer
or one in privity with him).' 3 Nineteenth and early twentieth century America
generally followed Winterbottom's privity requirement, ' 4 but courts gradually carved
out exceptions' 5 until privity was abrogated entirely in actions based upon negli-
gence.
Products liability law further developed as its theoretical foundation evolved
from contract to tort. ' 6 In the seminal case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., '7 the
New York Court of Appeals abolished contractual privity as a factor in negligence
cases.' 8 In holding an automobile manufacturer liable for injury to the ultimate
purchaser caused by the collapse of a defective wheel, the court reasoned that the
manufacturer, by placing the car upon the market, assumed a responsibility to the
public that rested not upon the contract, but upon the relation arising from the
7. Comment, Strict Liability: Recovery of "'Economic" Loss, 13 IDoO L. REV. 29, 30 (1976) [hereinafter
Comment].
8. See generally PRossER & KEEoN ON TORTS § 30 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter Psossar & KrmoNs].
9. Id.
10. For a brief exposition on the development of products liability law, see D. NoEL & J. PatnUiS, PRODucrs L ASnY
1-4 (1976); PRossER & KEETor, supra note 8, at §§ 95-97; Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and
Disclaimers in Defective Products Cases, 18 SrA. L. REv. 974, 990-92 (1966).
11. Wright v. Winterbottom, 10 Mess. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Exch. 1842).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 111, 152 Eng. Rep. at 403.
14. See, e.g., Lebourdais v. Vitrified Wheel Co., 194 Mass. 341, 80 N.E. 482 (1907).
15. The most notable exception was Huset v. J.1. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120 F. 865 (8th Cir. 1903), which
held the seller liable to a third person for negligence in the preparation or sale of an "imminently" dangerous article. Id.
at 872.
16. See, e.g., Note, supra note 1, at 118.
17. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). For a narrative story of the case, see D. PecK, DECtSION AT LAW, 38-69
(1961).
18. 217 N.Y. 382, 390-91, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916).
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consumer's purchase.' 9 In Dean Prosser's words, the rule that emerged from
MacPherson is that, "[T]he seller is liable for negligence in the manufacture or sale
of any product which may reasonably be expected to be capable of inflicting
substantial harm if it is defective.' '20 This decision found immediate acceptance and
is now universal law in every state.2'
B. Warranty
Historically, courts also have applied the theory of warranty to product liability
actions.22 Express warranties arise when the seller makes an affirmation of fact or
promise, describing the goods, or exhibiting samples or models that become part of
the basis of the bargain that the goods sold will so conform. 23 Implied warranties,
however, do not require any express representations. Unless modified or excluded, a
warranty that the goods are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used is implied if the seller is a merchant in goods of that kind.2 4 For a plaintiff to
prevail under an express or implied warranty theory, he must prove that such a
warranty was created, that the warranty was breached (the product sold failed to
conform to the seller's express or implied representations), and that the plaintiff
suffered resulting economic loss. 25
Because of the difficulty in proving that an express warranty was created, courts
gradually extended implied warranties of safety, initially applied to food and drink for
human consumption, to other products. 26 For example, courts progressively extended
implied warranties to such products as animal foods, 27 cosmetics, 28 and automo-
biles. 29 The leading case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,30 especially
noted for eliminating the necessity of establishing privity between buyer and seller,
19. Id.
20. Peossu & Kro, supra note 8, at § 96.
21. Id.
22. See generally id. at § 97.
23. Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter U.C.C.] § 2-313 (1) (1985) provides:
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes
part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or
promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that
the goods shall conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the
whole of the goods shall conform to the sample or model.
24. U.C.C. § 2-314 (1985) provides in relevant part:
(I) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in
a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind . . . .(2) Goods to be
merchantable must be at least such as . . . (c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used ....
25. PReossE & KEroj, supra note 8, at § 97. See also Comment, supra note 7, at 30-31.
26. Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633 (1913), the first case to discard the privity of contract
requirement, allowed a restaurant owner to recover damages for loss of reputation and profits against a remote supplier
when the restaurant owner sold spoiled meat to his customers. Id. at 624-26, 135 P. at 635-37.
27. See, e.g., McAfee v. Cargill, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 5 (S.D. Cal. 1954)(dog food).
28. See, e.g., Graham v. Bottenfield's Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413 (1954) (hair dye); Rogers v. Toni Home
Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958) (permanent wave hair solution).
29. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
30. Id.
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held both the remote automobile manufacturer and seller liable for injuries sustained
by the purchaser's wife on an implied warranty theory. 3' With privity requirements
eliminated, implied warranties soon reached virtually every type of defective product
from which tort law sought to protect the public. 32
Warranty theory, however, has had some difficulty in adapting to product
liability causes of actions. 33 Since the very term warranty has long been closely
associated with contract principles, courts have assumed that contract rules applied
and have barred recovery on contractual grounds including lack of privity, 34 failure
to give reasonable notice of breach, 35 and disclaimers of warranty. 36 Since plaintiffs
must overcome such contract defenses in a breach of warranty case, warranty theory
is not their most advantageous remedy. Tort remedies are easier to prove and lack the
contractual obstacles that plague commercial remedies.
Many courts, 37 however, have recognized that implied warranty is essentially a
tort, not a contract, and therefore have abandoned privity and notice of breach
requirements, 38 deemphasized disclaimers, 39 and have applied the tort statute of
limitations4o and rule of damages. 4' Nonetheless, it gradually became apparant that
product liability actions based upon warranty principles were unnecessarily burden-
some. 42 Thus, the concept of strict liability emerged.
C. Strict Liability
In Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno,43 Chief Justice Traynor
foreshadowed the future development of strict liability by stating that:
31. Id. at 414-15, 161 A.2d at 100.
32. See, e.g., Brown v. Chapman, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962) (hula skirt); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269
F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959) (tire); Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d
873 (1958) (cinder building blocks).
33. For a detailed discussion of the problems associated with warranties, see Prosser, The Assault Upon The Citadel
"Strict Liability To The Consumer," 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1127-34 (1960).
34. See, e.g., Harris v. Hampton Roads Tractor & Equip. Co., 202 Va. 958, 121 S.E.2d 471 (1961) (expressly
rejecting Henningsen).
35. Nekuda v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 175 Neb. 396, 121 N.W.2d 819 (1963); Wojcuik v. U.S. Rubber Co.,
19 Wis. 2d 224, 120 N.W.2d 47 (1963). Contra Bonker v. Ingersoll Products Co., 132 F. Supp. 5 (D.C. Mass. 1955)
(long delay held reasonable); Wright-Bachman, Inc. v. Hodnett, 235 Ind. 307, 133 N.E.2d 713 (1956) (notice of breach
held not to apply to personal injuries); LaHue v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Inc., 50 Wash. 2d 645, 314 P.2d 421 (1957)
(notice of breach requirements inapplicable between parties who had contracted).
36. Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041 (1954); Ryan v. Aid, Inc., 149 Mont. 367,427
P.2d 53 (1967). See also Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 L.A. L. REv. 122 (1961); Prosser,
The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 Mmw. L. REv. 117, 157-67 (1943).
37. See Comment, supra note 7, at 32.
38. See, e.g., Crystal Coca-Cola Bott. Co. v. Cathey, 83 Ariz. 163, 317 P.2d 1094 (1957); Ruderman v.
Warner-Lambert Pharmaceutical Co., 23 Conn. Supp. 416, 184 A.2d 63 (1962); Chandler v. Anchor Serum Co., 198
Kan. 571, 426 P.2d 82 (1967).
39. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
40. See, e.g., Zellmer v. Acme Brewing Co., 184 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1950); Page v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc.,
155 F. Supp. 283 (S.D. Tex. 1957); Smith v. Continental Ins. Co., 326 So. 2d 189 (Fla. App. 1976).
41. See, e.g., Tremeroli v. Austin Trailer Equip. Co., 102 Cal. App. 2d 464, 227 P.2d 923 (1951); Robinson v.
Williamsen Idaho Equip. Co., 94 Idaho 819,498 P.2d 1292 (1972); Camberm v. Hubbling, 307 Minn. 168, 238 N.W.2d
622 (1976).
42. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Brewer v. Oriard Powder
Co., 66 Wash. 2d 187, 401 P.2d 844 (1965).
43. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
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[P]ublic policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce
the hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that reach the market. It is
evident that the manufacturer can anticipate some hazards and guard against the recurrence
of others, as the public cannot .... It is needlessly circuitous to make negligence the basis
of recovery and impose what is in reality liability without negligence.-
Approximately twenty years later, the California Supreme Court in Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products, Inc. 45 specifically adopted the strict liability theory encour-
aged in Escola, which is defined in section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts4 6
as a plaintiff's proper remedy for harm suffered from the defendant's unsafe
product. 47 Strict liability is the simplest remedy for plaintiffs, essentially requiring
only that the product be defective, that the defect exist at the time the product leaves
the defendant's hands, and that the defect be the cause of the plaintiff's harm.48
Today, an overwhelming majority of jurisdictions have accepted strict liability in
tort, 49 thus contributing greatly to the expansion of modem products liability law.
D. Applicable Theories When the Defective Product Is Damaged
Negligence and strict liability theories, first adapted to personal injuries, also
have been applied when only property is damaged.50 For example, courts have
extended the reasoning of MacPherson5t and Henningsen,52 which abolished
contractual privity in cases involving personal injury, to cases involving only
property damage. 53 In addition, the American Law Institute clearly contemplated that
strict liability should be used in cases involving damage to property when it adopted
section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts which states that, "[o]ne who sells
any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer
44. Id. at 462-63, 150 P.2d at 440-41 (Traynor, C.J., concurring).
45. 59 Cal. 2d 57. 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). Justice Traynor noted that "[a] manufacturer is strictly
liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves
to have a defect that causes injury to a human being." Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
46. RESAmuwrN (SEco.,,) oF ToRes § 402A provides:
(I) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to
his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which
it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
47. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963).
48. See generally PRossEn & KEEro , supra note 8, at § 75.
49. Id. at § 98. See also 2 HtRsH & Ba-EY, AuucN L.,w oF P oDucrs LiABJn" §§ 3:12, 10:43 (2d ed. 1974).
50. See. e.g., Rocky Mountain Fire & Cas. Co. v. Biddulph Oldsmobile, 131 Ariz. 289, 640 P.2d 851 (1982);
Vulcan Materials Co. v. Driltech, Inc., 251 Ga. 383, 306 S.E.2d 253 (1983); Russell v. Ford Motor Co., 281 Or. 587,
575 P.2d 1383 (1978).
51. See supra notes 17-28 and accompanying text.
52. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
53. See Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YAsE L.J. 1099, 1100 n.9
(1960). See, e.g., Simpson v. Logan Motor Co., 192 A.2d 122 (D.C. 1963); Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., 372
S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1963).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48:533
or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the
ultimate user or consumer or to his property."'54 Chief Justice Traynor aptly stated the
rationale for applying strict liability to product cases: "Physical injury to property is
so akin to personal injury that there is no reason for distinguishing them." '55
The majority of courts today generally agree that harm to property caused by
defective products, including injury to the product itself, is recoverable under
negligence and strict liability theories.5 6 Most courts also have held, however, that
harm constituting economic loss is not recoverable under these theories, and must be
pursued under warranty concepts in the Uniform Commercial Code.5 7 Generally, tort
recovery is preferred over commercial remedies because tort theories avoid problems
inherent in commercial law, such as disclaimers,58 privity requirements,59 notice of
breach requirements, 60 restrictive damages, 6 1 and shorter statutes of limitation. 62
The fine line between property damage and economic loss is difficult to draw.
Several courts have stated that the line drawn depends on the nature of the defect, the
type of risk it creates, and the manner in which the injury arose. 63 One court,
representative of this view, concluded that if an unreasonably dangerous product
causes a "sudden and calamitous" event64 that threatens bodily harm and also
happens to damage the product, the loss generally is found to be property loss
recoverable in tort actions. 65 Conversely, many courts hold that harm to property due
to mere deterioration, internal breakage, or other nonaccidental causes constitutes an
54. RESTA TEEr (SEcoND) oF TORTS § 402A (1) (1965) (emphasis added). See also RAsTrAT-EIEM (SEcoND) or Tomrs §
402A comment d (1965).
55. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 19, 403 P.2d 145, 152, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 24 (1965).
56. See, e.g., Vulcan Materials Co., Inc. v. Driltech, Inc., 251 Ga. 383, 306 S.E.2d 253 (1983); National Crane
Corp. v. Ohio Steel Tube Co., 213 Neb. 782, 332 N.W.2d 39 (1983); Russell v. Ford Motor Co., 281 Or. 587, 575 P.2d
1383 (1978).
57. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1981); Seely v.
White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91
Ill. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982); Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1981); Schiavone
Constr. Co. v. Elgood Mayo Corp., 56 N.Y.2d 667, 436 N.E.2d 1322, 451 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1982). But see Santor v. A
& M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965) (allowing recovery under strict liability theory for economic
loss).
58. U.C.C. § 2-316 (1985).
59. U.C.C. § 2-318 (1985). For a detailed discussion of the privity defense, see WnrE & SUmmEms, Umaom
COMMERCIAL ODE §§ 11-1, -7 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter W\Vrm & SuMMERS].
60. U.C.C. § 2-607 (3)(a) provides:
(3) Where a tender has been accepted (a) the buyer must within a reasonable time after he discovered any breach
notify the seller of breach or be barred from any remedy ....
61. U.C.C. §§ 2-714, 715 (1985). Generally, damages recovered under tort theories are greater than those
recovered under contract theories. See, e.g., Medieros v. Coca-Cola Bott. Co., 57 Cal. App. 2d 707, 135 P.2d 676
(1943); Brown v. General Motors Corp., 67 Wash. 2d 278, 407 P.2d 461 (1965).
62. U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (1985) provides:
(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four years after the cause of action
has accrued.
63. Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1981); Cloud v. Kit Mfg.
Co., 563 P.2d 248 (Alaska 1977).
64. Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248, 251 (Alaska 1977).
65. Id. See also Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 CoLmi. L. REv. 917, 918 (1966)
[hereinafter Economic Loss in Products Liability]; c.f. Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305
(1965).
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economic loss, recoverable solely in a warranty action. 66 Some courts, however,
allow strict liability tort recovery for purely economic loss. 67
Economic loss has been further subdivided into direct economic loss-the cost
of repair or replacement, and consequential economic loss-the denial of profits
while the product is not functioning properly. 68 One court noted that the essence "of
a product liability tort case is not that the plaintiff failed to receive the quality of
product he expected, but that the plaintiff has been exposed, through a hazardous
product, to an unreasonable risk of injury to his person or property." 69 Certainly, a
difference exists between a disappointed buyer and an endangered one. 70
E. Theories Applied Under Ohio Common Law
Presently, Ohio law allows recovery for purely economic loss to the defective
product itself under both strict liability7 ' and implied warranty in tort, 72 but not under
a negligence theory. 73 The Ohio Supreme Court first addressed the issue of whether
direct economic losses are recoverable under tort theories in Inglis v. American
Motors Corp.74 Although holding that direct economic loss cannot be recovered
under a negligence theory, the court concluded it was recoverable under a uniquely
fashioned express warranty theory.75 Despite their use of the arguably contractual
remedy of warranty, the court made it clear that the express warranty theory
employed sounded in tort, rather than in contract. 76 It is important to note that this
case did not involve property damage caused by a violent occurrence that also
threatened bodily harm. Rather, it concerned the economic loss caused by a
defectively manufactured automobile. 77
Five years later, in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Truck & Concrete
Equipment Co.,78 the Ohio Supreme Court held that direct economic losses could be
66. See, e.g., Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976); Sharp Bros. Contracting Co. v.
American Hoist & Derrick Co., 703 S.W.2d 901 (Mo. 1986) (Higgins, C.J., dissenting); Comment, Manufacturers'
Liability to Remote Purchasersfor "Economic Loss" Damages-Tort or Contract?, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 539, 541 (1966);
Economic Loss in Products Liability, supra note 65, at 918.
67. See, e.g., Verdon v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 187 Conn. 363, 371 n.6, 446 A.2d 3, 8 n.6 (1982); Santor v. A
& M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965); Mead Corp. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 355
(N.D. Ohio 1979).
68. Schwartz, Economic Loss in American Tort Law, in THE LAw OF Toar: PoucrEs AND TrENos m Lt F.rry fo
Dx,.tsEe To Popery AND Ecoxo\,tc Loss 92-93 (M. Furmston ed. 1986).
69. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69, 81, 435 N.E.2d 443, 448 (1982), (citing Pennsylvania
Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165, 1169 (3d Cir. 1981)).
70. Contra Forrest v. Chrysler Corp., 632 S.W.2d 29, 31 (Mo. App. 1982).
71. Mead Corp. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 355 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
72. Iacono v. Anderson Concrete Corp., 42 Ohio St. 2d 88, 326 N.E.2d 267 (1975); United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. v. Truck & Concrete Equip. Co., 21 Ohio St. 2d 244, 257 N.E.2d 380 (1970); Lonzrick v. Republic Steel
Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966).
73. See Inglis v. American Motors Corp., 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965). But see Continental Oil Co.
v. General Transp. Corp., 409 F. Supp. 288, 296-97 (S.D. Tex. 1976) (incorrectly construing lacono to have allowed
recovery in negligence).
74. 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965).
75. Id. at 140, 209 N.E.2d at 588.
76. Id. at 136, 209 N.E.2d at 586.
77. Id. at 137, 209 N.E.2d at 586.
78. 21 Ohio St. 2d 244, 257 N.E.2d 380 (1970).
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recovered under the tort theory of breach of implied warranty. 79 In United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., a cement mixer fell off of the chassis of the cement truck,
resulting in losses of $7000 to the truck. 80 On these facts, the violent occurrence
foreseeably could have caused injury to persons as well as property. In addition,
economic loss was clearly present. Thus, the court relied on both grounds to correctly
determine that the manufacturer was liable in tort. 8'
The Ohio Supreme Court further refined the implied warranty theory in lacono
v. Anderson Concrete Corp.8 2 In Iacono the plaintiff sought recovery for damage
to a concrete driveway installed by defendant that "pitted" because defendant used
a type of aggregate in the concrete mix not suited for outdoor application.8 3 The
court allowed plaintiff's recovery, concluding that the tort theory of breach of
implied warranty could be used to recover for harm solely to the product. 84 Since the
court's implied warranty theory was identical to the theory of strict liability in tort,
the court allowed recovery under implied warranty for harm caused by a product's
qualitative defect without regard for the unreasonably dangerous requirement of
strict liability. 85
In a significant decision, Mead Corp. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co.,86 the District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio, relying on Iacono87 and Inglis,8 8 permitted
the plaintiff to recover in strict liability for losses arising out of the failure of a
generator used in plaintiff's business. 89 Recognizing that the losses sustained were
economic in nature, the court nonetheless held that Ohio allowed such recovery. 90
Thus, it is clear that Ohio's established case law permits tort recovery under various
theories when damage is sustained solely to the defective product itself. However, if
any of these cases had arisen under the proposed Ohio act, the plaintiffs could only
pursue warranty remedies because the statute interprets any damage to the product
itself to be economic loss. 91
F. Theories Applied Under Common Law from Other Jurisdictions
The first major case involving strict liability in tort as applied to economic loss
was Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc.92 In that case, the consumer purchased a
defective and virtually worthless rug that the defendant-manufacturer had produced. 93
The New Jersey Supreme Court held that strict liability in tort is a proper remedy for
79. Id. at 251-52, 257 N.E.2d at 384.
80. Id. at 245, 257 N.E.2d at 381.
81. Id. at 251-52, 257 N.E.2d at 384.
82. 42 Ohio St. 2d 88, 326 N.E.2d 267 (1975).
83. Id. at 88, 326 N.E.2d at 268.
84. Id. at 93, 326 N.E.2d at 271.
85. Id.
86. 465 F. Supp. 355 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
87. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
89. 465 F. Supp. 355, 366 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
90. Id. at 366.
91. H.B. No. 996, 116th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess., § 2307.71 (B) (1985-86).
92. 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
93. Id. at 56, 207 A.2d at 307.
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products liability cases involving direct economic loss, even though the carpeting
itself did not pose an unreasonable risk of harm to the plaintiff or his property.9 4 The
court based its decision upon Henningsen,95 which assumed that because consumers
are inherently unable to bargain with manufacturers, tort remedies are necessary to
safeguard their interests. 96
One post-Santor commentator noted that a plaintiff should recover all damages
directly resulting from the defective product's condition if the product "causes, or
has reasonable potential for causing, harm to the plaintiff's person or property other
than the product itself. Recovery should turn on the nature of the product and not the
damages incurred. ,97 Santor is a significant decision because it treats similarly all
harm resulting from a defective product. The New Jersey court makes no distinction
based on the nature of the harm incurred, rather it focuses on the nature of the
product. 98 Such an emphasis furthers an underlying objective of strict liability that
deters manufacturers from marketing defective products by holding them liable for all
resulting harm caused by their defects. The responsibility of the manufacturer should
remain constant, regardless of the nature of the losses incurred.
Conversely, the California Supreme Court in Seely v. White Motor Co.99
rejected this bargaining power analysis and concluded that contract principles govern
all economic loss cases. 00 In that case, the plaintiff, a small businessman, demanded
lost profits when a defective truck he had purchased from the defendant over-
turned.' 0' Although the court ultimately awarded consequential damages on an
express warranty theory,102 Chief Justice Traynor's opinion refused to extend strict
liability in tort to cover economic losses.' 03 Believing that the Santor decision
unreasonably burdened manufacturers with unlimited and unforeseeable liability, the
court held that such losses, given their commercial nature, were only recoverable
under the express warranty provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code.' ° 4 The
California Supreme Court's conclusion that a manufacturer "cannot be held for the
level of performance of his products in the consumer's business unless he agrees that
the product was designed to meet the consumer's demands" 1 05 ignores policy
considerations that favor holding manufacturers liable for defectively manufactured
products. 106 Purchasers should not have to secure express warranties from manufac-
turers that their products are not defective or unreasonably dangerous before the law
will hold them liable.
94. Id. at 66-67, 207 A.2d at 312-13.
95. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
96. 44 N.J. 52, 64-65, 207 A.2d 305, 311-12 (1965).
97. Comment, supra note 7, at 41 (emphasis in original).
98. 44 N.J. 52, 66-7, 207 A.2d 305, 312-13 (1965).
99. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
100. Id. at 18, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
101. Id. at 12, 403 P.2d at 147, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
102. Id. at 13, 403 P.2d at 148, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
103. Id. at 18, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
104. Id. at 15-19, 403 P.2d at 149-52, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 21-24.
105. Id. at 18, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
106. See infra notes 143-51 and accompanying text.
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Chief Justice Traynor, however, did note that strict liability in tort covered harm
to property on the theory that it was very similar to personal injury.1 0 7 On this issue,
the court held that tort law will provide a remedy for the consumer whose property
is damaged by virtue of an unreasonably dangerous defect in a product, although tort
law will not provide a remedy to a buyer who is harmed because the product fails to
meet his economic expectations. 108 Therefore, it is significant that had the plaintiff in
Seely been able to prove that a defect in the truck actually caused the rollover, the
court would have allowed recovery in strict liability for harm to the product itself
caused by the unreasonably dangerous defect. 0 9 Under this reasoning, Seely
comports with the dictates of Santor by conceding that strict liability is appropriate
when a defective product causes harm to either persons or property.1 0
Santor and Seely represent the boundaries between the conflicting tort and
contract theories. Seely exemplifies the majority view that denies recovery in strict
liability for losses caused by a product's qualitative defects and the product's resultant
failure to meet the buyer's expectations.1 ' Santor represents the minority view,
allowing recovery for all losses caused by a defective product, whether or not the
product is unreasonably dangerous.l"2
To distinguish between recoverable (in tort) damages caused by unreasonably
dangerous product defects and nonrecoverable damages caused by a product's
qualitative defects, the courts generally have looked to the circumstances surrounding
the plaintiff's claim to determine whether the damage is a result of a defect that poses
an unreasonable risk of harm to the consumer or his property."l3 The Alaska Supreme
Court, for example, denied recovery for defects in a mobile home that made it a
"lemon" but were not unreasonably dangerous."l 4 In this case, although "[the]
trailer was not suited for the purpose for which it was purchased .... the defects in
it were not such that they resulted in sudden, violent or calamitous harm." ' 5 Thus,
the court's decision reflects the policy of not allowing recovery when the plaintiffs
were merely deprived of the value of their bargain. In a subsequent case, the same
court permitted recovery when the rug padding in a mobile home caught fire, causing
a sudden and calamitous occurrence which destroyed the home and its contents. 1 6
Therefore, in those two cases, the Alaska Supreme Court distinguished between
plaintiffs deprived of the benefit of their bargain, and plaintiffs exposed to an
unreasonable risk of harm through defective products that happened to cause a sudden
and calamitous injury solely to the product itself.' 17
107. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 19, 403 P.2d 145, 152, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 24 (1965).
108. Id. at 18, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
109. Id. at 19, 403 P.2d at 152, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
110. Id. at 18, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
111. See generally L. FRuiER & M. FRIEMAN, 5 PRODs. LIDA. app. H at § 16A [41[k] (1982) [hereinafter FRutME &
FRDiAN)]; Bland & Wattson, supra note 2, at 32.
112. See, e.g., Bland & \vattson, supra note 2, at 32.
113. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1981).
114. Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976).
115. Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248, 251 (Alaska 1977) (discussing the facts of Morrow).
116. Id.
117. Id.
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III. LEGISLATIVE REFORMS OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW
A. Ohio House Bill 996
In an attempt to reduce the mounting costs of product liability insurance, Ohio
has introduced a comprehensive products liability reform bill. l 18 Essentially, the
legislation substitutes a product liability act for all Ohio common law dealing with
tort product liability cases. House Bill 996 twice excludes tort recovery for damage
to a product injured or destroyed by its own defect. First, the proposed act explicitly
states that it does not extend to any civil action for injury or loss caused to a product
itself or for commercial loss caused by a product." 19 Applicable Ohio commercial or
contract law would govern these actions. Specifically, the bill provides that "[a] civil
action for injury or loss caused to a product itself or for commercial loss caused by
a product is not a product liability action. . . and shall be governed by the applicable
commercial or contract law of this state."' 120 Second, the proposed act further
excludes tort liability by defining harm as "injury or loss to property other than a
product itself."' 21
Read in conjunction, these two statements indicate that tort theories are not
available to a plaintiff seeking recovery for the loss of his defective products. The bill
intentionally preempts all product liability case law sounding in tort and substitutes
this product liability act. 122 Since the proposed act clearly excludes from its coverage
losses to the product itself, such losses would be recoverable only under commercial
or contract law. 123
The bill's proponents might argue that the legislation only preempts current case
law to the extent that an action falls within the scope of the proposed act. Since claims
for loss to the product itself are not covered by the bill, plaintiffs can still recover
under tort theories for such damage. However, this interpretation would contravene
clear legislative intent to substitute a product liability act for all Ohio case law
concerning tort product liability cases.
In addition, proponents might argue that the bill would not change existing law
even if the act were interpreted to preempt tort product liability cases. The legislation
provides that damage to the product itself is covered not under the act, but under
commercial law. Since some Ohio courts 124 have interpreted warranty theories to be
essentially torts, proponents can argue that the act's limitation of remedies to solely
commercial law would not change current case law that construes commercial
theories (warranty) as tort theories. Such an interpretation, however, would nullify
the explicit legislative intention to substitute a comprehensive act for Ohio common
law product liability actions that are construed as torts. The fact that the theory was
118. H.B. No. 996, 116th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1985-86).
119. H.B. No. 996, 116th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess., § 2307.71(B) (1985-86).
120. Id.
121. H.B. No. 996, 116th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess., § 2307.70(E) (1985-86).
122. H.B. No. 996, 116th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess., § 2307.81(A) (1985-86).
123. H.B. No. 996, 116th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess., § 2307.71(B) (1985-86).
124. See, e.g., Iacono v. Anderson Concrete Corp., 42 Ohio St. 2d 88, 326 N.E.2d 267 (1975); Inglis v. American
Motors Corp., 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
pleaded originally in warranty is irrelevant if the court ultimately interpreted the
action to be a tort.
The Ohio bill abolishes valid tort remedies without providing adequate substi-
tutes. By restricting recovery to commercial and contract law theories, the bill's
drafters construe all harm to the product itself to be economic loss recoverable only
under warranty theories. The proposed act, however, disregards situations in which
an unreasonably dangerous product causes "sudden and calamitous" damage that
threatens personal injury as well as damage to the product t25 -situations in which, as
previously noted, the damage to the product may be classified as a property loss
rather than as an economic loss.
Under the pending act, plaintiffs could only recover through warranty principles
regardless of how the injury occurred. This result would reward manufacturers,
which are fortunate enough to have the defect only injure the product by allowing him
to escape strict liability in tort, thus circumventing the ultimate policy that manu-
facturers are liable for unreasonably dangerous products. 126
The pending legislation is unsatisfactory for yet another reason. By allowing harm
to persons caused by a defective product to fall within the bill's scope, but not harm
to the defective product itself, a plaintiff suffering both personal harm and loss to the
defective product is forced to pursue two separate causes of action. Requiring such
a plaintiff to bring a tort action under the proposed act for personal injuries and a
warranty action under commercial common law for harm to the defective product is
ineffective. Most importantly, this will confuse the jury. As noted earlier, 2 7 a typical
warranty action involves many elements and potential defenses. The bill demands too
much from jurors by requiring them to separate and understand causes of action based
upon statutory and common law. Since the average juror is likely to be confused by
such a situation, the proposed act risks incorrect and inconsistent jury verdicts.
B. United States Senate Bill 100
Congress also is currently considering a uniform product liability law.128 Since
the proposed Ohio act is modeled after the federal bill, the acts' implications are very
similar. For example, in defining "harm," Senate Bill 666 does not include "loss or
damage caused to a product itself.112 9 In addition, the bill states that "[a] civil action
for loss or damage to a product itself or for commercial loss is not subject to this Act
and shall be governed by applicable commercial or contract law." 13o
Consistent with the proposed Ohio act, the federal bill also replaces tort
remedies with remedies in commercial or contract law. As noted above, all product
injuries cannot be categorized as economic loss. Thus, when an unreasonably
dangerous product causes harm to itself, the bill rescinds currently applicable tort
125. Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248, 251 (Alaska 1977).
126. See PRossER & Kas.o, supra note 8, at § 98. For additional policy justifictions, see REsrAm.uNr (SEco.oD) OF
ToRTs § 402A comment c (1965).
127. See supra notes 22-42 and accompanying text.
128. S. 666, 100th Cong., lst Sess. (1987).
129. S. 666, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 102 (a)(9) (1987).
130. S. 666, 100th Cong., lst Sess. § 103 (a) (1987).
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remedies without an adequate replacement. One recent commentator opposing the bill
noted that these changes in existing law would be "unnecessarily obtrusive into
traditional areas of states' rights, and unsupported by any discernible public policy.
For example, physical injury to the product itself is excepted from products litigation
under the proposed Act, although the clear trend is to include such injury within the
scope of products liability."' 131
C. Legislation in Other States
Most states have some legislation that addresses product liability law, 3 2 yet
most of these states have not enacted statutes as broadly restrictive as the Ohio and
federal bills.' 33
For example, the majority of statutes provide recovery in tort for personal injury,
death, or property damage without specifically excluding damage to the product
itself. 134 One representative statute provides that:
a product liability action shall include any action brought for or on account of personal
injury, death or property damage caused by or resulting from the manufacture, construction,
design, formulation, development of standards, preparation, processing, assembly, testing,
listing, certifying, warning, instructing, marketing, advertising, packaging or labeling of
any product. 35
Thus, statutes of this type leave open the question of what constitutes economic
loss, allowing the individual facts of each case to determine the answer. Such a result
is consistent with established common law recoveries, unlike the Ohio and federal
bills.
Connecticut's product liability act, 136 for example, specifically includes damage
to the product itself within the scope of the law by including it in the definition of
"harm."' 137 The statute further specifies that between commercial parties, harm does
not include economic loss; therefore, an action for economic loss caused by a product
may only be brought under the Uniform Commercial Code.13 8 By allowing recovery
in tort for damage to defective products without overgeneralizing that all such damage
constitutes economic loss, Connecticut has enacted a model product liability statute
that accurately reflects current common law. In addition, Connecticut's statute is
exemplary because it does not require commercial remedies that have been shown to
131. Phillips, The Proposed Federal Liability Statute From The Toxic Tort Plaintiff's Perspective, 28 Vni.. L. REv.
1156, 1159-60 (1982-83).
132. For a compilation of product liability statutes that have been enacted by various states, see 2 PRODs. L aB. REP.
(CCH) 69, 110 etseq. (1981); Fauhm & FkimumN,, supra note 11l, at app. H.
133. But see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3302 (1981); VAsH. REv. CoDE § 7.72.010 (1981).
134. AiA. CODE § 6-5-521 (a) (1979); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-681 (3) (1978); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2812 (e)
(1979); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 13-21-401 (1977); Co-N. GEN. STAT. §52-572m (d) (1983); Ir. CODE. ANN. § 33-1-1.5-2 (West
1983); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 411.300 (1) (Bobbs-Merrill 1978); MicH. Co.w. LAws ANN. § 600.2945 (West 1978); NEB.
REv. STAT. § 25-21,180 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-1 (3) (1979); OR.. REv. STAT. § 30.900 (1977); R.I. GEN. LAws §
9-1-32 (1) (1978); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10 (Law. Co-op 1974); TEs. CODE ANN. § 29-28-102 (6) (1978); UTAH CODE
A .'. § 78-15-6 (1953).
135. Ky. REv. STAT. § 411.300 (1979)(emphasis added).
136. Co.s. GEN. STAT. § 52-572 m-r (1983).
137. Id. at § 52-572m (d).
138. Id.
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be inadequate t39 for harm to the product. Connecticut's product liability law is
especially noteworthy because it embodies the important policy consideration that
manufacturers will be liable under a variety of theories for injuries caused by their
defective products. Fortunately, Connecticut has not shielded manufacturers from tort
liability as the Ohio and federal legislation proposes to do. Rather, Connecticut has
retained tort theories to protect consumers from unreasonably dangerous products. Due
to the recency of this legislation, however, it has not been tested in the Connecticut
courts.
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS SUPPORT TORT RECOVERY
Both United States Senate Bill 666 and Ohio House Bill 996, if enacted, will
have a significant effect on existing products liability jurisprudence. Today, the
majority of courts permit recovery in tort-generally, strict liability-when an
unreasonably dangerous defect causes damage to the product itself."t4 Many
courts,14 1 including those in Ohio,142 even allow strict liability tort remedies solely
for economic loss. Furthermore, by essentially ignoring important policy consider-
ations underlying strict liability in tort, these two pieces of legislation may prove to
be a substantial setback for the developing law of strict products liability.
A. Public Policy Supports Tort Recovery
Statutory mandates requiring contractual remedies when only the product is
harmed subverts the major purpose of strict liability-to deter manufacturers from
marketing products that are hazardously defective. 143 Deterrence theory reasons that
the manufacturer, rather than the injured consumer, should bear the risk of the unsafe
products it places on the market because the consumer has a right to expect that a
product will be safe for its intended use. 44 In fact, Chief Justice Traynor noted that
"[i]mplicit in the [product's] presence on the market... [is the] representation that
it [will] safely do the job for which it was built."t45 This risk allocation is equally
applicable when only the purchaser's property is injured because a purchaser is
139. See supra notes 33-42 and accompanying text and infra notes 152-67 and accompanying text.
140. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1981); Seely v.
White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965); Vulcan Materials Co. v. Driltech, Inc., 251 Ga.
383, 306 S.E.2d 253 (1983); John R. Dudley Constr. v. Drott Mfg. Co., 66 A.D.2d 368, 412 N.Y.S.2d 512 (1979);
Russell v. Ford Motor Co., 281 Or. 587, 575 P.2d 1383 (1978); Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d
854 (W. Va. 1982).
141. See, e.g., Verdon v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 187 Conn. 363, 371 n.6, 446 A.2d 3, 8 n.6 (1982); Cora v. Harley
Davidson Motor Co., 26 Mich. App. 602, 182 N.W.2d 800 (1970); Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52,
207 A.2d 305 (1965); City of LaCross v. Schubert, Schroeder & Assocs., Inc., 72 Wis. 2d 38, 240 N.W.2d 124 (1976).
142. Mead Corp. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 355 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (strict liability); Iacono v.
Anderson Concrete Corp., 42 Ohio St. 2d 88, 326 N.E.2d 267 (1975).
143. See Comment, supra note 7, at 42-43. The typical policy justifications for strict liability are criticized by
Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Liability, 33 Varo. L. R~v. 681 (1980).
144. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1981). As a
practical matter, one of the most powerful incentives to produce safe products is to avoid developing a reputation for
unsafe and defective products. Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects in Products-An
Opposing View, 24 TENN. L. REv. 938, 945 (1957).
145. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 64, 377 P.2d 897,901,27 Cal. Rptr. 697,701 (1963).
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similarly unable to protect itself from the hazardous product. Thus, a manufacturer's
responsibility to market safe products should not depend on the fortuity of whether a
person escapes injury. Especially in today's increasingly complex world, in which
consumers cannot test products for potential defects, the manufacturer's duty to
produce safe products must remain of primary importance, regardless of whether the
hazard's ultimate impact is on people, other property, or the product itself.
Another major purpose of strict liability in tort is to prevent a manufacturer from
contractually limiting the scope of his responsibility for harm caused by his prod-
ucts. 146 Although a common argument is that commercial parties to a contract should
be limited to contractual remedies, there is no logical reason for the proposition that
a commercial entity, as opposed to a noncommercial consumer, must bargain for a safe
product.' 47 Commercial purchasers have a right to buy a product free from hazardous
defects, and the manufacturer has a duty to provide safe equipment. 4 8 Thus, the Ohio
and federal legislation which require that plaintiffs must resort exclusively to Uniform
Commercial Code remedies and may not recover under tort law when the product itself
is damaged is inconsistent with policies underlying tort and contract principles. Since
purchasers should not be expected to bargain for a safe product, contract law cannot
adequately adapt to the problem of hazardous defects.
In addition, other policy justifications have been convincing to courts that have
accepted strict liability in tort. For example, the harm caused by defectively damaged
products can best be bome by the manufacturers who make and sell these products. 149
Manufacturers have the unique capacity to distribute the losses of the few among
the many who purchase these products by charging higher prices. By marketing his
product for use, the seller undertakes a special responsibility toward any purchaser
who may be or whose property may be harmed by the product. Likewise, the
consuming public has a right to and does expect that reputable sellers will stand
behind their goods. Thus, the burden of accidental injuries must be borne by those
who market the product as safe to consumers, rather than the unfortunate purchaser
who relies on such marketing to his detriment.
Furthermore, accident prevention can be promoted by adopting strict liability
and eliminating the need to prove negligence.' 50 Given the high costs of litigation,
proof of negligence in the sale or manufacture of a defective product should not be
required. By reducing impediments to proving a strict liability cause of action, more
manufacturers would be held liable on strict liability theories, thus encouraging more
careful production methods and hopefully reducing accidents due to defective
products. 5 1
146. Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
147. Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1981); Moorman Mfg. Co.
v. National Tank Co., 91 111. 2d 95, 96-97, 435 N.E.2d 443, 455-56 (1982) (Simon, J., concurring).
148. Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165, 1175 (3d Cir. 1981).
149. Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944)(Traynor, J., concurring);
Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248, 250 (Alaska 1977). See also PRossER & KErros, supra note 8, at § 98; RE.TATemeNT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A comment c (1965).
150. Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 269 Or. 485, 493, 525 P.2d 1033, 1041-42 (1974).
151. However, it has also been argued that strict liability will inhibit the development of new products and may not
induce any greater degree of care than liability based on negligence. PRossER & K roN, supra note 8, at § 98.
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B. Contract Remedies Are Not Adequate Substitutes for Tort Remedies
The difference between pursuing a claim through tort remedies and pursuing the
same claim under contractual remedies is striking. First, the scope of liability under
tort principles is much broader than under contract.1 52 Since contractual recovery
depends upon a breached promise by the defendant, an injured plaintiff must satisfy
the Uniform Commercial Code's requirements for express or implied warranties. 53
Tort remedies, however, generally attach as soon as the manufacturer places a
defective product into the stream of trade and promotes its sale to the public. 154
A defendant in a breach of contract action has access to all contractual defenses
such as valid disclaimers, 155 misuse, 156 failure of plaintiff to give reasonable notice
of breach, 157 expiration of the statute of limitations, 158 and lack of privity.159
Generally, however, there are fewer tort defenses available than defenses under the
Uniform Commercial Code. In addition, tort defenses vary with the jurisdiction.
Some states allow defenses such as intervening cause of injury160 and "state of the
art," 161 which denies strict liability when the product was as safe as current
technology permitted it to be. 162 Courts generally decide applicable tort defenses on
a case-by-case basis.163
The Uniform Commercial Code also requires a plaintiff suing in contract to
notify the warrantor of any product nonconformities within a "reasonable time" after
tender has been accepted. '64 This notification requirement is not necessary under tort
remedies. In addition, applicable statutes of limitation vary with contract and tort
actions. Breach of warranty actions must be brought under the Uniform Commercial
Code within four years of the transaction. 165 Conversely, tort actions are governed by
each jurisdiction's personal injury statute, which frequently lengthen the available
time to bring an action by allowing the tolling of statutes of limitation in tort actions
until the injury actually is discovered. 166
Given the striking differences between pursuing an action in contract and tort,
it seems evident that legislation that completely abolishes tort remedies is unduly
152. Compare, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-313 (1985) with Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305
(1965). See also Note, supra note 1, at 122.
153. U.C.C. § 2-313, supra note 23.
154. Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
155. WHr & SusisreRs, supra note 59, at §§ 12-1, -5.
156. WurrE & Su t i s, supra note 59, at § 11-8.
157. WHrr & Sutismms, supra note 59, at § 11-10.
158. \vnr & SuowERs, supra note 59, at § 11-9.
159. Wm'r & SumiEsS, supra note 59, at § 11-2.
160. Balido v. Improved Machinery, Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 105 Cal Rptr. 800 (1973).
161. See Ward v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 450 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1971); Pontifex v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 226 F.2d
909 (4th Cir. 1955); Cantu v. John Deere Co., 603 P.2d 839 (Wash. 1979). But see Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products
Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982) (state of the art defense held impermissable in strict liability actions).
162. See generally PRossER & KEe'ro, supra note 8, at § 99; Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect,
5 Sr. MARY'S L.J. 30 (1973); Note, Product Feasibility Reform Proposals: The State of the Art Defense, 43 ALs. L. Rv.
941 (1979).
163. See, e.g., Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965); Note, supra note 1, at 123.
164. U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) (1985), supra note 60.
165. U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (1985), supra note 62.
166. See, e.g., Rosenau v. City of New Brunswick, 51 N.J. 146, 238 A.2d 177 (1968).
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restrictive upon plaintiffs. Generally, contract theories are more difficult to prove and
are basically more cumbersome than tort theories.' 67 In addition, requiring a plaintiff
to pursue a contract theory that necessitates a more onerous burden of proof
undermines policy concerns that simplify proof requirements under tort theories to
better assist plaintiffs in recovering from manufacturers of defective products.
Furthermore, there seems to be no logical reason for abolishing existing tort theories
of recovery and substituting inadequate commercial remedies, save a desire to reduce
manufacturer's liability. However, such a rationale is unsound because manufacturers
must be held liable when their defective products do, in fact, cause injury. Thus, the
Ohio and federal legislation should include, by amendment, tort recovery when the
defective product itself is damaged.
V. CONCLUSION
The Ohio and federal product liability reform acts, as proposed, abolish valid,
existing theories of recovery without providing an adequate substitute when an
unreasonably dangerous product causes injury to itself. Both acts incorrectly
characterize any loss to the product itself as economic loss. Such a characterization
is inconsistent with numerous factual situations that may arise when the defective
product threatens personal injury as well as injury to the product. In these cases, strict
liability tort policies require that the manufacturer should not escape tort liability
because he was lucky that the defective product did not injure any person or collateral
property. In addition, many states, including Ohio, allow tort recovery for qualitative
defects in a product.
This proposed legislation should not prohibit tort recovery already permitted by
existing case law for economic loss. Similarly, legislation should not expressly
provide that manufacturers automatically escape tort liability in situations in which
recovery is sought only for physical loss to the defective product. The solely
commercial remedies enumerated in these proposed bills are inconsistent with
existing law that allows tort remedies in such cases and are clearly inadequate when
an unreasonably dangerous product injures itself. In essence, the current wave of tort
reform should not be allowed to swell to such a level that it drowns out valid
plaintiff's rights.
Therefore, the most workable solution is to amend the Ohio and federal bills to
include product liability actions seeking recovery for damage to the defective product
itself within the scope of the acts. Such an amendment would be consistent with
current law in most states, would further the previously articulated policies of strict
liability in tort, and would prevent inconsistent and anomalous results.
Julie A. Dunwell
167. See generally l:ossER & Krox, supra note 8, at § 98.

